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		1.	Introduction		Imagine	 the	 following	 scenario.	 You’re	 at	 home	when	 suddenly	 your	 housemate	 enters,	crying.	Not	knowing	what	the	matter	is,	you	immediately	walk	up	to	her	and	put	your	arm	around	her,	trying	your	best	to	console	her.	As	you	take	a	glance	through	the	open	door	you	realise	what	happened:	her	car	is	in	the	driveway	and	your	cat	lies	motionless	on	the	ground	beneath	 it.	You	 freeze	and	then	push	your	housemate	away.	Trying	to	apologise,	she	grabs	your	hands,	but	you	shake	her	off,	rush	outside,	kneel	down	beside	the	car,	and	carefully	place	a	hand	on	your	cat’s	body.	To	your	dismay,	he	doesn’t	respond.	After	sitting	with	him	for	a	while,	you	gently	pick	up	his	limp	body	and	cradle	him	in	your	arms.		 This	 little	 tale	 illustrates	 the	 extent	 to	which	 touch	 is	 naturally	 involved	 in	 our	social	interactions.	In	fact,	humans	can	communicate	a	range	of	distinct	emotions	through	touch	 alone	 (Hertenstein	 et	 al.	 2009).	 Moreover,	 in	 human	 infancy,	 touch	 is	 a	 more	important	and	earlier	mode	of	social	interaction	than	verbal	communication	(Hertenstein	et	al.	2006),	and	communicative	touch	has	been	postulated	as	the	evolutionary	precursor	to	language	(Ibid.).	Not	for	nothing,	touch	is	called	‘the	first	sense’:	 it	 is	the	first	sensory	faculty	 to	 develop	 in	 the	 womb,	 and	 its	 neural	 receptor	 types	 are	 among	 the	 oldest	 in	evolutionary	history	(Fulkerson	2014,	xii).	All	of	this	makes	it	likely	that	touch	also	plays	an	 important	 role	 in	 the	 social	 lives	 of	 non-linguistic	 animals.	 But,	 importantly,	 the	interactions	in	the	story	we	told	are	not	only	social,	they	have	a	moral	hue,	and	indeed	the	characters	 use	 touch	 to	 express	 various	 moral	 emotions,	 such	 as	 sympathy,	 guilt,	resentment,	 love,	 and	grief.	 This	 gives	 rise	 to	 the	question	we	want	 to	 address,	 namely,	could	the	ways	in	which	animals	engage	in	and	navigate	touch	interactions	give	us	insight	into	their	moral	capacities?	In	 this	paper,	we	will	outline	how	the	animal	morality	debate	can	benefit	 from	a	closer	 look	 at	 the	 role	 of	 touch	 in	 the	 social	 interactions	 of	 animals.	 This	 has	 been	prompted	by	the	work	of	Maria	Botero	on	primate2	social	cognition,	in	which	she	suggests	that	scientists	studying	joint	attention	and	theory	of	mind	need	to	move	away	from	a	focus	on	 vision,	 because	 touch	 as	 ‘the	 first	 sense’	 might	 be	 an	 earlier	 facilitator	 of	 these	capacities	(Botero	2016,	2018a,	2018b).	We	think	that	the	importance	of	these	claims	on	the	 role	of	 touch	extends	beyond	the	 specific	 case	of	 social	 cognition	and	 the	particular																																																														2	Botero’s	argument	applies	to	both	human	and	nonhuman	primates,	but	 in	referring	to	her	work	we	shall	focus	on	the	case	of	nonhuman	primates.	Accordingly,	we	use	the	terms	‘primate’	and	‘ape’	to	refer	to	nonhuman	ones.	
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order	 of	 primates.	 Although	 the	 animal	 morality	 debate	 is	 not	 characterised	 by	 a	 bias	towards	vision,	we	will	show	that	scientists	have	been	operating	with	a	different	bias:	a	narrow	 view	 of	 morality	 that	 prematurely	 limits	 the	 variety	 of	 moral	 practices	 that	animals	could	be	capable	of.	This	bias	can	be	partially	corrected	by	paying	more	attention	to	touch.	Our	aim	is	to	argue	that	a	careful	examination	of	touch	in	animals	can	shed	new	light	on	current	debates	on	animal	morality,	like	the	study	of	consolation	behaviour,	while	also	revealing	further	forms	that	animal	morality	could	take	and	that	have	been	neglected	so	far,	like	the	capacities	for	tolerance	or	trust.			 We	will	begin	this	paper	by	giving	a	quick	overview	of	the	animal	morality	debate3		and	showing	how	the	 issue	of	 touch	has	received	only	scarce	and	 implicit	attention.	We	will	 then	 defend	why	 this	 needs	 to	 be	 remedied.	 This	 defence	will	 be	 structured	 as	 an	analysis	of	the	three	main	functions	of	touch	and	their	relevance	for	animal	morality.	The	first	 two	 functions	(the	discriminative	 and	 the	 affiliative	 function)	are	 acknowledged	by	Botero	and,	as	we	will	argue,	the	reasons	why	they	are	important	for	animal	morality	are	closely	connected	to	the	reasons	why	Botero	considers	them	to	be	important	for	primate	social	cognition.	The	third	function	we	will	consider	is	the	vigilance	function	as	described	by	Filip	Mattens	 (2017),	which	 is	not	mentioned	by	Botero.	While	 touch	 in	 its	 vigilance	role	may	not	be	so	relevant	for	social	cognition,	we	will	argue	that	this	is	a	crucial	function	to	consider	when	discussing	the	role	of	touch	in	animal	morality.	Before	we	begin,	we	must	make	a	short	terminological	clarification,	since	the	term	‘touch’	 is	somewhat	ambiguous.	 If	we	exclude	all	metaphorical	and	 literary	uses,	we	can	distinguish	two	broad	meanings.	On	the	one	hand,	‘touch’	can	be	used	to	refer	to	(1)	two	physical	 entities	 coming	 into	 contact,	which	 can	be	 either	 (a)	 the	 result	 of	 a	purposeful	action	(e.g.	“I	touched	her	cheek”)	or	(b)	a	non-voluntary	event	(e.g.	“The	two	umbrellas	were	 touching”).	On	 the	other	hand,	 ‘touch’	can	also	refer	 (2)	 to	 the	act	of	perceiving	by	means	of	the	tactile	sense	(e.g.	“She	touched	something	slimy”),	or	to	the	tactile	sense	itself	(e.g.	“She	can	read	by	touch”).	In	this	paper,	we	are	mostly	concerned	with	meaning	(1a).	However,	 since	 acts	 of	 purposefully	 coming	 into	 contact	with	 a	physical	 entity	 typically	entail	 perception	 by	means	 of	 the	 tactile	 sense,	 meaning	 (2)	 cannot	 be	 completely	 left	aside.	The	only	sense	of	the	word	‘touch’	we	are	not	concerned	with	is	(1b),	that	is,	non-voluntary	touch.	This	 is	because	we	are	concerned	with	touch	 interactions	that	are,	 to	a	certain	 degree	 at	 least,	 under	 the	 animals’	 control,	 for	 they	 are	 the	 ones	 that	 can	 be	indicative	of	their	cognitive	and	emotional	capacities.	In	addition	to	excluding	all	forms	of																																																														3	Throughout	the	paper,	we	will	refer	to	many	empirical	studies	to	substantiate	our	claims.	A	lot	of	this	research	can	be	seen	as	ethically	problematic,	and	we	would	like	to	note	that	our	reference	to	any	particular	study	does	not	imply	an	endorsement	of	its	methodology.	
	 4	
touch	 that	 occur	 non-voluntarily,	 we	 will	 also	 leave	 aside	 forms	 of	 touch	 that	 occur	through	 a	 medium.	 This	 is	 purely	 for	 simplicity	 reasons,	 since	 we	 do	 not	 in	 principle	exclude	 that	 there	may	be	moral	 capacities	 expressed	 through	distal	 touch	 (e.g.	 using	 a	stick	to	probe	or	feel)	or	hybrid	forms	thereof	(e.g.	tacto-acoustic	signals	in	dolphins).		 	2.	The	neglect	of	touch	in	the	animal	morality	debate		As	Fitzpatrick	(2017)	rightly	points	out,	there	are	two	distinct	discussions	contained	in	the	animal	morality	 debate.	 One	 discussion,	 exemplified	 by	 the	 theoretical	work	 of	 authors	such	as	Bekoff	and	Pierce	(2009)	and	de	Waal	(e.g.	1996),	but	especially	by	the	empirical	studies	 done	 in	 labs	 and	 in	 the	 field,	 concerns	 the	 distribution	 in	 nature	 of	 certain	psychological	 capacities	 that	 are	 generally	 understood	 to	 be	 indicators	 of	 (proto-)morality;	 capacities	 such	 as	 empathy,	 altruism,	 or	 inequity	 aversion.	 The	 other	discussion,	present	in	the	work	of	philosophers	such	as	Korsgaard	(2006)	and	Rowlands	(e.g.	2012),	centres	on	whether	 these	psychological	capacities	actually	deserve	 the	 label	‘moral.’	 The	 first	 debate	 is	more	 of	 an	 empirical	 endeavour,	 the	 second	 one	 consists	 of	conceptual	analysis	and	clarification.	In	this	paper,	we	are	mostly	concerned	with	the	first	of	these	debates,	that	is,	with	addressing	the	empirical	study	of	the	distribution	in	nature	of	moral	capacities.	Although	we	will	offer	some	conceptual	reasons	 for	 linking	 touch	 to	morality,	 our	main	 aim	 is	 to	 highlight	 how	a	 close	 analysis	 of	 the	 touch	 interactions	 of	animals	could	provide	evidence	of	psychological	capacities	that	are	directly	or	indirectly	involved	in	moral	practices.	Those	readers	who	remain	uneasy	about	the	use	of	the	term	‘morality’	to	describe	animal	behaviour	can	reinterpret	our	arguments	as	a	discussion	of	proto-morality	in	animals.4	If	we	understand	the	animal	morality	debate	in	the	first	way	described	above,	we	can	distinguish	three	broad	research	foci:	the	altruism	cluster,	the	fairness	cluster,	and	the	empathy	 cluster.5	 The	 altruism	 cluster	 consists	 of	 studies	 that	 investigate	 animals’																																																														4	Though	we	will	often	use	 the	 term	 ‘animals’	as	a	 shorthand,	our	analysis	 throughout	 the	paper	mostly	focuses	on	nonhuman	social	mammals.	This	is	due	to	space	constraints	and	to	the	present	bias	in	the	relevant	behavioural	and	physiological	 literature.	It	should	not	be	taken	as	an	a	priori	exclusion	of	the	possibility	of	moral	practices	in	non-mammalian	species.		5	This	is	an	artificial	classification	and	not	all	studies	will	 fall	neatly	into	one	category	or	another.	For	instance,	some	of	the	evidence	of	animal	empathy	comes	from	anecdotal	accounts	of	altruistic	helping	(e.g.	Bates	et	al.	2008),	and	the	animals	in	the	altruism	experiments	may	be	motivated	to	help	others	by	empathic	mechanisms.	In	addition,	it	should	be	noted	that	in	classifying	the	studies	this	way	we	take	inspiration	in	the	three	clusters	of	animal	moral	behaviours	that	Bekoff	and	Pierce	(2009)	talk	about.	However,	our	distinction	does	not	map	on	exactly	to	theirs.	While	we	talk	of	the	altruism	cluster,	the	fairness	cluster,	and	the	empathy	cluster,	they	talk	of	the	cooperation	cluster,	the	 empathy	 cluster,	 and	 the	 justice	 cluster.	 The	 change	 is	 not	 fortuitous.	We	 are	 not	 trying	 to	reproduce	Bekoff	 and	Pierce’s	 ideas,	 but	 rather	 capture	 the	main	 research	 foci	 of	 contemporary	
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capacity	to	engage	in	altruistic	helping,	that	is,	helping	behaviour	that	involves	no	direct	gain	 or	 even	a	direct	 loss	 for	 the	 helper,	where	 the	 relevant	 behaviour	 is	motivated	 by	concern	 for	 the	 other	 and	 not	 the	 result	 of	 pure	 self-interest.	 In	 addition	 to	 many	observational	reports	of	wild	animals	helping	each	other	(e.g.	Bates	et	al.	2008;	Park	et	al.	2012),	there	are	also	several	experimental	studies	in	this	cluster.	The	latter	can	be	divided	into	 two	 rough	 groups.	 The	 first	 one	 corresponds	 to	 what	 could	 be	 called	 the	 ‘active	helping’	 experimental	 paradigm,	 where	 animals	 are	 given	 the	 option	 of	 helping	 an	individual	who	 is	 distressed	 or	 otherwise	 in	 need.6	 The	 second	 group	 of	 studies	 in	 the	altruism	 cluster	 corresponds	 to	 what	 is	 known	 as	 the	 ‘prosocial	 choice’	 experimental	paradigm,	where	animals	can	choose	to	spontaneously	benefit	another	individual	who	is	not	necessarily	in	need	nor	actively	asking	for	help.7	The	fairness	cluster	consists	of	studies	that	investigate	whether	animals	possess	a	sense	of	fairness.	In	the	field	of	comparative	psychology,	this	is	exemplified	by	the	inequity	aversion	studies,	where	pairs	of	animals	are	rewarded	unequally	for	performing	the	same	task	and	 their	 reactions	observed	 to	 see	 if	 they	 track	 this	 inequality.8	Animals’	 sense	of	fairness	 has	 also	 been	 a	 research	 focus	 of	 observational	 studies,	 predominantly	 those	concerned	with	 social	 play.	 Social	 play	 in	mammals	often	 involves	behavioural	patterns	that	are	similar	to	 those	used	in	predation	or	mating.	To	avoid	misinterpretation	during	play,	 these	 animals	 often	use	play	markers.	Different	species	of	 canids,	 for	 instance,	 use	the	play	bow	as	a	signal	(Bekoff	1977)	and	chimpanzees	have	been	found	to	increase	their	play	signaling	when	the	mother	of	their	play	partner	is	in	close	proximity,	presumably	as	a	way	of	preventing	her	 from	 intervening	and	ending	 the	play	bout	 (Flack	et	al.	2004).	 In																																																																																																																																																																																			empirical	 approaches	 to	 animal	morality.	 Bekoff	 and	Pierce	 have	 a	 very	 broad	understanding	 of	animal	morality,	 and	 their	 three	 clusters	 encompass	 a	wide	 range	 of	 behaviours,	 since	 they	 use	them	 to	 illustrate	 the	 different	 forms	 that	 animal	 morality	 could	 take.	 Under	 cooperation	 they	include	 “altruism,	 reciprocity,	 honesty,	and	 trust;”	 under	 empathy,	 “sympathy,	 compassion,	 grief,	and	 consolation;”	 under	 justice,	 “sharing,	 equity,	 fair	 play,	 and	 forgiveness”	 (Bekoff	 and	 Pierce	2009,	xiv).	While	we	think	that	their	open-mindedness	is	commendable,	it	is	an	exception	and	not	the	rule	in	the	animal	morality	debate.	This	broad	understanding	of	morality	does	not	correspond	to	how	animal	morality	is	being	systematically	studied.	There	are,	for	instance,	barely	any	studies	on	 honesty,	 trust,	 or	 forgiveness	 in	 animals.	 We	 are	 therefore	 using	 these	 three	 clusters	 in	 a	narrower	sense,	as	explained	below.	6	Positive	results	in	the	‘active	helping’	sub-group	have	been	obtained	with	rodents	(e.g.	Bartal	et	al.	2011;	Ueno	et	al.	2019),	pigeons	 (Watanabe	and	Ono	1986),	and	primates	 (e.g.	Masserman	et	al.	1964;	Warneken	and	Tomasello	2006).	7	Positive	results	using	this	paradigm	have	been	obtained	with	chimpanzees	(Horner	et	al.	2011),	capuchin	 monkeys	 (Lakshminarayanan	 and	 Santos	 2008),	 common	 marmosets	 (Burkart	 et	 al.	2007),	 cotton-top	 tamarins	 (Cronin	 et	al.	 2010),	 rats	 (e.g.	Hernandez-Lallement	 et	al.	 2015)	 and	parrots	(Brucks	and	Bayern	forthcoming).	8	Apparent	‘inequity	aversion’	has	been	found	in	chimpanzees	(e.g.	Brosnan	et	al.	2010),	capuchin	monkeys	 (Brosnan	 and	 de	Waal	 2003)	 cotton-top	 tamarins	 (Cronin	 and	 Snowdon	 2008),	 long-tailed	macaques	(Massen	et	al.	2012),	dogs	(e.g.	Range	et	al.	2009),	rats	(Oberliessen	et	al.	2016),	crows,	and	ravens	(Wascher	and	Bugnyar	2013).	
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order	 to	play	 ‘fairly’,	mammals	 also	 engage	 in	 self-handicapping,	which	occurs	when	an	animal	 does	 not	 use	 her	 full	 strength	 when	 playing	 with	 another	 individual,	 and	 role-reversing,	 which	 takes	 place	 when	 an	 animal	 engages	 in	 a	 behaviour	 that	 does	 not	correspond	to	her	relative	place	in	the	hierarchy	(Špinka	et	al.	2001).	The	 last	 big	 research	 focus	 corresponds	 to	 the	 empathy	 cluster.	 This	 comprises	studies	on	emotional	contagion,	the	spontaneous	‘catching’	of	another’s	emotion,	which	is	widely	viewed	as	a	basic	form	of	empathy.	This	ability	is	commonly	tested	in	animals	by	providing	them	with	visual	or	auditory	access	to	emotional	cues	from	another	individual,	and	measuring	whether	there	are	any	signs	of	emotional	state-matching	in	the	witnessing	subject.9	The	empathy	cluster	is	also	made	up	of	experimental	and	observational	studies	that	 have	 documented	 consolation	 behaviour,	 which	 is	 a	 form	 of	 affiliative	 behaviour	directed	at	 individuals	 in	distress	and	 is	 thought	 to	be	 triggered	by	empathic	processes.	Apparent	consolation	has	been	observed	in	a	wide	range	of	animals,	including	some	avian	species	(see	Table	1).	As	one	 can	 see	 from	 this	quick	 overview,	 the	 topic	 of	 touch	 has	 received	 scarce	attention	 in	 these	 debates.	 In	 the	 tests	 that	 are	 commonly	 used	 to	 study	 these	 moral	capacities	in	animals,	the	experimental	subjects,	when	there	is	more	than	one,	are	usually	separated	from	each	other,	in	order	to	facilitate	testing	and	avoid	any	confounding	factors.	Thus,	 the	 test	conditions	 tend	to	physically	prevent	animals	 from	touching	one	another.	Obviously,	 this	 is	 not	 the	 case	 in	 field	 studies,	 where	 the	 natural	 interactions	 of	 wild	animals	 are	 observed.	 Although	 animals	 often	 touch	 each	 other	 when	 they	 engage	 in	helping	and	play	behaviours,	this	specific	issue	has	not	been	the	explicit	focus	of	studies	to	date.	An	exception	to	this	lack	of	attention	to	animal	touch	is	provided	by	the	consolation	studies.		Consolation	 behaviour	 in	 animals	 was	 first	 described	 by	 de	 Waal	 and	 van	Roosmalen	 (1979).	 It	 is	 defined	as	 “an	 increase	 in	affiliative	 contact	 in	 response	 to	 and	directed	toward	a	distressed	individual,	such	as	a	victim	of	aggression,	by	an	uninvolved	bystander,	 which	 produces	 a	 calming	 effect”	 (Burkett	 et	 al.	 2016,	 375,	 our	 emphasis).	Thus,	 the	 idea	 of	 touch	 (‘affiliative	 contact’)	 is	 present	 in	 the	 very	 definition	 of	 this	behaviour.	 However,	 even	 though	 the	 majority	 of	 criteria	 used	 to	 identify	 consolation	involve	 the	 animals	 touching	 in	 one	 way	 or	 another	 (see	 Table	 1),	 scientists	 do	 not	explicitly	reflect	on	 this,	 to	 the	extent	 that	 ‘touch’	 is	often	listed	as	a	separate	behaviour																																																														9	The	available	evidence	suggests	that	emotional	contagion	is	an	ability	possessed,	at	the	very	least,	by	 chimpanzees	 (Parr	 2001),	 greylag	 geese	 (Wascher	 et	 al.	 2008),	 dogs	 (e.g.	Huber	et	 al.	 2017),	mice	 (e.g.	 Langford	 et	 al.	 2006),	 rats	 (e.g.	 Atsak	 et	 al.	 2011),	 prairie	 voles	 (Burkett	 et	 al.	 2016),	chickens	 (Edgar	et	 al.	 2011),	 pigs	 (e.g.	Goumon	 and	 Špinka	 2016),	 cockatiels	 (Liévin-Bazin	et	 al.	2018),	and	kea	(Schwing	et	al.	2017).			
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instead	 of	 as	 a	 common	 denominator.	 The	 general	 focus	 of	 the	 consolation	 studies	 has	been	 on	 who	 is	 involved	 in	 the	 consolation	 interaction,	 what	 happened	 immediately	before	the	consolation	event,	what	happened	afterward,	and	what	are	the	motives	of	the	consoler.	Although	 consolation	 is	 largely	 thought	 to	occur	 via	 touch,	 the	 implications	of	this	are	not	explicitly	reflected	upon.			
Study	 Species	 Other-directed	affiliative	behaviours	used	as	consolation	indicators	de	Waal	and	van	Roosmalen	1979	 Chimpanzees	 Kissing,	embracing,	hold-out-hand,	touching,	submissive	vocalisations	Kutsukake	and	Castles	2004	 Chimpanzees	 Allo-grooming,	sitting	in	contact,	gentle	touching,	kissing,	embracing,	wrapping	an	arm	around	another,	passing	touch,	mounting,	grasping	testicles,	playing,	inspecting	another’s	genitals	Palagi	et	al.	2004	 Bonobos	 Contact	sitting,	grooming,	touching	(gentle	patting	or	stroking	movements),	sociosexual	behaviours,	play	Cordoni	et	al.	2006	 Gorillas	 Contact	sitting,	embracing,	grooming,	touching,	touching	in	walk,	playing	Seed	et	al.	2007	 Rooks	 Bill	twining	Fraser	et	al.	2008	 Chimpanzees	 Kissing,	embracing,	grooming,	finger-in-mouth	touching,	gentle	touching,	playing,	submissive	pant-grunt	greeting	Palagi	and	Cordoni	2009	 Wolves		 Body	contact,	social	licking,	social	play,	inspecting,	social	sniffing	Cozzi	et	al.	2010	 Horses	 Mutual	grooming,	friendly	contact,	nasal	sniff,	body	sniff,	genital	sniff,	play,	approach,	follow	Fraser	and	Bugnyar	2010	 Ravens	 Contact	sitting,	preening,	beak-to-beak	touching,	beak-to-body	touching	McFarland	and	Majolo	2012	 Barbary	macaques	 Grooming,	body	contact,	mutual	teeth	chattering,	successful	<1.5m	approaches	Clay	and	de	Waal	2013	 Bonobos	 Embracing,	socio-sexual	contact	(genito-genital	contact,	mounting,	copulating,	genital	touch),	touching,	grooming,	contact	sitting,	holding,	patting,	playing,	inspecting	Palagi	and	Norscia	2013	 Bonobos	 Grooming,	touching,	contact-sitting,	embracing,	kissing,	socio-sexual	interactions,	social	play,	food-sharing	Baan	et	al.	2014	 Wolves	 Body	contact,	nose	touch,	licking,	playing,	greeting,	sniffing,	inspecting	Palagi	et	al.	2014	 Japanese	macaques,	Tonkean	macaques	
Grooming,	contact	sitting,	touching,	playful	contacts,	mounting,	manipulating	
genitals,	copulating,	kissing,	mouthing,	cheek-to-cheek,	face	holding,	face	sniffing	Plotnik	and	de	Waal	2014	 Asian	elephants	 Body	contact,	vocalisations	Burkett	et	al.	2016	 Prairie	voles	 Licking,	grooming	Quervel-Chaumette	et	al.	2016	 Dogs	 Affiliative	behaviours:	rubbing	one’s	own	body	alongside	that	of	the	partner,	greeting	(licking	the	lips	of	the	partner,	whilst	tail	wagging),	play,	sniffing	any	body	part;	time	spent	in	proximity			This	 lack	 of	 attention	 to	 touch	 comes	 at	 an	 explanatory	 cost,	 since	 the	neurophysiology	 of	 affiliative	 touch	 can	 shed	 some	 light	 on	 why	 consolation	 is	
Table	 1.	 Consolation	 studies	 and	 the	 criteria	 used	 to	 identify	 consolation	 behaviour.	 In	 italics:	 those	criteria	that	necessarily	entail	touch;	most	of	the	other	listed	behaviours	can	involve	touch	too.	
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comforting.10	It	has	recently	been	discovered	that	nerve	fibres	found	in	hairy	mammalian	skin,	which	covers	major	parts	of	most	mammalian	bodies,	seem	to	be	specifically	attuned	to	processing	social	touch,	especially	affiliative	touch	in	the	form	of	slow,	gentle	stroking	(Löken	 et	 al.	 2009;	 McGlone	 et	 al.	 2014).	 These	 nerve	 fibres,	 called	 C-tactile	 afferents,	apparently	process	 slow,	 gentle	 touch	 as	 ‘pleasant’	 and	 ‘affiliative’	 the	way	 other	 nerve	fibres,	 for	 example,	 process	noxious	 stimuli	as	 ‘painful’	 (Löken	et	al.	 2009).	 Consolation	behaviour	 in	 the	 form	of	slow,	gentle	touch	 is	 thus	 likely	especially	effective	 in	having	a	calming	 effect.	 Of	 course,	 other	 factors	 like	 social	 context	 also	 influence	 how	 touch	 is	ultimately	 experienced.	 However,	 CT	 afferents	 point	 to	 a	 significant	 ‘social	 bias’	 of	 the	mammalian	nervous	system.	The	importance	of	considering	these	socially-attuned	nerve	fibres	is	further	underlined	by	the	fact	that	they	have	been	found	in	all	species	examined,	i.e.	primates,	pigs,	rats,	mice,	guinea	pigs,	rabbits,	and	cats,	and	it	has	been	suggested	that	all	mammals	possess	 them	(Morrison	2012;	Pitcher	et	al.	2016).	Despite	 its	explanatory	potential,	the	neurophysiology	of	affiliative	touch	is	hardly	considered	in	the	consolation	studies.11	We	propose	that	greater	attention	to	the	identification	of	consolation	behaviour	with	a	certain	kind	of	touch	may	inform	research	in	this	area.	This	overview	of	 the	animal	morality	debate	not	only	shows	that	scientists	have	paid	 only	 scarce	 and	 implicit	 attention	 to	 the	 issue	 of	 touch,	 but	 also	 that	 they	 have	operationalised	morality	 in	 a	 rather	 narrow	way.	 There	 are	many	 other	 ways	 of	 being	moral12	 besides	 being	 empathic,	 altruistic,	 and	 averse	 to	 inequity.	 These	 include	 being	grateful,	 caring,	 trusting,	 tolerant,	 and	 loyal,	 as	well	 as	being	 resentful,	 envious,	 jealous,	disgusted,	 and	 cruel.	 This	 narrow	 conception	 of	 morality	 is	 not	 the	 sole	 fault	 of	 the	scientists,	 but	 is	 surely	 influenced	 by	 moral	 philosophers,	 who	 have	 traditionally	attempted	 to	 reduce	 morality	 to	 one	 or	 two	 key	 capacities.	 And	 naturally	 there	 are	exceptions	 on	 both	 sides.	 Among	 the	 scientists,	 Bekoff	 (Bekoff	 and	 Pierce	 2009)	 has	defended	 a	 pluralistic	 account	 of	 morality.	 Among	 the	 philosophers,	 Pierce	 (Ibid.),	Rowlands	 (2012),	 Monsó	 and	 Andrews	 (forthcoming),	 and	 Rutledge-Prior	 (2019)	 have	also	 given	 accounts	 of	 animal	 morality	 that	 presuppose	 a	 pluralistic	 framework.	 We	propose	 that	 this	 pluralistic	 approach	 is	 the	 way	 to	 go,	 since	 opting	 for	 a	 narrow	operationalisation	 of	morality	 could	 amount	 to	 a	premature	 reduction	 that	 failed	 to	 do																																																														10	 Scientists	 clearly	 expect	 consolation	 to	 be	 comforting,	 because	 they	 often	 either	 define	consolation	 as	 a	 behaviour	 that	 produces	 a	 calming	 effect	 or	 they	 look	 for	 evidence	 of	 a	 stress	reduction	in	the	consoled	individual.	However,	to	the	best	of	our	knowledge,	none	of	the	scientists	working	on	consolation	have	explained	why	they	expect	the	behaviours	that	they	deem	indicative	of	consolation	to	be	comforting.		11	A	single	study	on	prairie	voles	(Burkett	et	al.	2016)	mentions	the	role	of	oxytocin,	a	mammalian	hormone	associated	with	social	touch	(Uvnäs-Moberg	et	al.	2005)	and	attachment	(Feldman	2011,	380),	in	consolation	behaviour.	12	We	are	using	the	term	‘moral’	not	in	its	normative	but	in	its	descriptive	sense.		
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justice	 to	 the	 range	 of	 moral	 practices	 that	 animals	 are	 potentially	 capable	 of.	 Though	some	 of	 these	 practices	 may	 be	 out	 of	 reach	 for	 animals,	 this	 should	 not	 be	 assumed	without	empirical	investigation.		We	 will	 argue	 that	 animals’	 touch	 interactions	 could	 reveal	 nuances	 in	 the	practices	thus	far	considered	in	the	animal	morality	debate	(such	as	consolation	and	social	play),	 while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 providing	 evidence	 of	 some	 of	 these	 alternative	 ways	 of	being	moral.	Our	 focus	 throughout	 the	paper	will	 be	on	potential	 cases	of	what	we	 call	‘moral	practices,’	which	we	define	as	 those	 that	 involve	 the	exercise	of	moral	capacities.	Since	 we	 do	 not	 want	 to	 circumscribe	 our	 claims	 to	 a	 particular	 account	 of	 moral	capacities,	 the	 readers	 should	 understand	 this	 term	 in	 a	 broad	 sense,	 as	 capacities	 that	imply	 a	 “sensitivity	 to	 [some	 of]	 the	 good-	 or	 bad-making	 features	 of	 situations”	(Rowlands	 2012,	 230)	 or	 as	 those	whose	 exercise	 conveys	 information	 about	 a	 being’s	moral	 character	 (Parrott	 2019).	 We	 understand	 moral	 capacities	 to	 include	 moral	emotions	(those	that	are	involved	both	in	pro-social	and	in	anti-social	behaviour),	as	well	as	 other	 capacities	 that	 can’t	 be	 classified	 as	 emotions	 but	 could	 still	 be	 said	 to	 ‘track’	moral	 properties	 (in	 Rowlands’	 [2012]	 sense),	 such	 as	 trust,	 care,	 or	 normative	capacities.13	 For	 the	purposes	of	 this	paper,	 it	 is	 not	necessary	 that	we	 take	 a	 stand	on	whether	any	of	these	capacities	on	its	own	is	enough	to	endow	an	animal	with	full-blown	morality.	Instead,	what	we	will	argue	is	that	looking	at	animals’	touch	interactions	has	the	potential	to	help	reveal	many	of	these	(proto-)moral	capacities.14	In	what	follows,	we	will	explain	this	by	analysing	the	three	functions	of	touch	and	their	connection	to	potentially																																																														13	We	understand	‘normative	capacities’	as	the	ability	to	make	normative	evaluations	about	others’	behaviour,	as	well	as	the	ability	to	comply	with	and	enforce	normative	standards	of	behaviour.	See	section	5.	14	An	interesting	question	posed	by	a	reviewer	is	whether	there	are	studies	that	employ	the	frame	of	touch	to	explore	morality	in	humans.	Studies	on	human	moral	psychology	mostly	focus	on	gaze	(e.g.	 showing	 clips	 of	 antagonistic	 interactions	 and	 just	 or	 unjust	 punishment	 to	 pre-linguistic	children	 and	 tracking	 their	 gaze	 to	 infer	 their	 understanding	 of	 norms	 and	 fairness),	 visual-	 or	auditory-mediated	emotional	contagion	(e.g.	babies	crying	in	response	to	hearing	another	baby	cry	as	an	indicator	of	the	innateness	of	empathy),	and,	as	soon	as	developmentally	possible,	language	(e.g.	to	inquire	about	moral	judgments).	Since	humans	have	linguistic	abilities,	studies	of	our	moral	capacities	may	not	benefit	as	much	from	a	focus	on	touch	as	the	study	of	animal	morality.	However,	some	studies	do	document	the	role	of	touch	in	humans’	moral	interactions	broadly	construed.	For	instance,	affective	touch	has	been	found	to	affect	our	impression	of	others	(e.g.	Fisher	et	al.	1976),	and	to	have	a	positive	effect	on	compliance	and	cooperation	in	mundane	situations	(e.g.	Goldman	et	al.	2010),	which	may	affect	moral	decision-making,	e.g.	in	the	context	of	helping.	Affective	touch	is	also	a	prominent	criterion	in	the	studies	of	consolation	in	pre-linguistic	infants	or	infants	in	early	linguistic	development.	Consolation	in	these	infants	is	operationalised,	 like	in	animals,	as	hugging	the	 distressed	 other	 or	 offering	 some	 other	 form	 of	 comfort	 contact	 (e.g.	 Zahn-Waxler	 1992).	Researchers	 have	 also	 found	 an	 analgesic	 effect	 of	 partner	 touch,	which	 increases	when	 a	more	empathic	partner	provides	the	touch	(Goldstein	et	al.	2018;	Goldstein	et	al.	2016).	Lastly,	touch	may	also	 play	 a	 role	 in	 the	 experiencing	 of	 moral	 disgust,	 though	 it	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 the	 link	between	physical	revulsion	as	a	protective	mechanism	and	moral	disgust	is	controversial	(Oaten	et	al.	2018).	
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moral	practices.	Though	we	will	separate	these	three	functions	for	analytic	purposes,	it	is	important	to	bear	in	mind	that	in	reality	they	intertwine	and	support	each	other.			3.	The	discriminative	function	of	touch	and	its	importance	for	animal	morality		Touch	 in	 its	 discriminative	 function	 serves	as	 a	perceptual	 source	of	 information.	When	the	body	of	a	being	with	a	tactile	sense	comes	into	contact	with	a	physical	entity,	there	is	some	 information	 made	 available	 to	 that	 being	 about	 the	 qualities	 of	 the	 entity	 being	touched,	 such	 as	 its	 shape,	 temperature,	motion,	 texture,	malleability,	 and	so	on.	This	 is	the	discriminative	function	of	touch,	and	it	does	not	reduce	to	the	touching	of	inanimate	objects,	 but	 extends	 to	 touching	 other	 living	 beings.	 For	 this	 reason,	 Botero	 has	 argued	that	discriminative	 touch	must	 be	 factored	 into	discussions	 on	primate	 social	 cognition	(Botero	2016,	1203–4).	In	this	section,	we	will	show	how	this	should	be	extended	to	the	animal	morality	debate.	In	arguing	for	the	importance	of	discriminative	touch	in	primate	social	cognition,	Botero	is	going	against	the	general	trend	in	debates	and	experiments	on	this	topic,	which,	as	 she	 herself	 points	 out,	 have	 been	 characterised	 by	 an	 almost	 exclusive	 focus	 on	 the	visual	sense.	Joint	attention,	for	example,	is	commonly	understood	as	a	triadic	interaction	occurring	between	 two	subjects	who	 coordinate	 their	 attention	on	one	object.	Although	attention	 is	 not	 necessarily	 linked	 to	 visual	 perception,	 most	 of	 the	 research	 on	 joint	attention	 in	primates	has	been	 circumscribed	 to	 testing	 their	 ability	 to	 follow	another’s	gaze	on	an	object	(see	Carpenter	and	Call	2013	for	a	review).	Research	on	theory	of	mind	in	primates	has	likewise	privileged	the	visual	mode.	Although	theory	of	mind	refers	to	the	general	 ability	 to	 attribute	 mental	 states	 to	 others,	 a	 significant	 proportion	 of	 studies	attempts	 to	determine	whether	primates	possess	a	 theory	of	mind	by	studying	whether	they	 can	understand	what	others	 can	and	 cannot	see	 (see	Andrews	2017	 for	 a	 review).	And	even	 those	 studies	 that	 focus	on	 the	 attribution	of	 a	different	 type	of	mental	state,	namely,	 emotions,	 tend	 to	 emphasise	 the	 sense	of	vision.	 Indeed,	a	 common	method	 for	measuring	 emotions	 in	 primates	 concentrates	 on	 their	 facial	 expressions,	 which	 are	 a	visual	way	of	 expressing	 emotions,	 and	most	 of	 the	 experiments	 that	have	been	 carried	out	to	determine	whether	primates	can	attribute	emotions	to	others	have	tested	for	their	ability	to	visually	discriminate	facial	expressions	of	emotions	(e.g.	Parr	2001;	2003).	Botero	 suggests	 that	 the	 operationalisation	 of	 socio-cognitive	 capacities	 via	 the	visual	 modality	 results	 in	 a	 limited	 understanding	 of	 social	 cognition	 in	 primates.	 She	points	out,	for	instance,	that	chimpanzees’	facial	features	lack	the	salient	contrasts	that	in	
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our	 case	 allow	 for	 an	 easy	 visual	detection	of	 the	 subtle	 facial	movements	 that	 indicate	emotions	 (Botero	2018b,	 373).	This	means	 that	 the	discrimination	of	 facial	 expressions	may	not	play	such	an	important	role	in	the	attribution	of	emotions	amongst	chimpanzees.	In	addition,	chimpanzee	mothers	rarely	use	prolonged	gaze	as	a	form	of	interaction	with	their	offspring.	However,	during	the	first	nine	months,	infant	chimpanzees	spend	most	of	the	time	in	close	contact	with	their	mothers,	who	carry	them	around	as	they	go	about	their	day.	By	means	of	this	touch	interaction,	the	infant	chimpanzee	learns	about	the	mother’s	reaction	 to	different	 stimuli,	 thereby	gaining	 information	on	her	perspective	 and	on	 the	world	surrounding	them	(Botero	2016,	1204–5).	Botero	considers	that,	due	to	similarities	in	neurophysiology	and	infant	development	across	primate	species,	these	points	probably	generalise	to	other	apes.	Discriminative	touch	thus	likely	constitutes	the	very	first	source	of	social	information	that	apes	make	use	of,	and	by	means	of	it	they	can	learn	“that	there	are	 others	 and	 that	 these	 others	 have	 a	 different	 perspective,	 two	 basic	 traits	 of	 joint	attention	and	theory	of	mind”	(Botero	2018b,	377).		 Since	discriminative	 touch	 is	 a	 source	of	 social	 information,	 and	moral	practices	require	social	information,	discriminative	touch	can	support	moral	practices.	In	order	to	respond	 in	 ways	 that	 are	 morally	 appropriate	 or	 that	 exemplify	 the	 use	 of	 a	 moral	capacity,	 the	 animal	 first	 has	 to	 gauge	 the	 social	 situation.15	 In	 certain	 circumstances,	namely	 when	 there	 is	 bodily	 contact	 involved,	 the	 relevant	 social	 information	 can	 be	gauged	by	means	of	touch.	For	instance,	in	the	case	of	consolation	behaviour,	the	consoler	can	gain	tactile	information	on	whether	the	other	is	tense	or	relaxed,	which	can	be	used	to	determine	when	the	contact	should	go	on	and	when	it	can	stop.	Likewise,	the	appropriate	duration	of	other	affiliative	behaviours,	 like	grooming,	can	be	informed	by	touch,	e.g.	the	groomer	 can	use	 it	 to	discriminate	when	the	 recipient	 is	annoyed	by	or	uninterested	 in	this	interaction.			 Touch	can	also	be	used	to	gain	information	about	other	morally	relevant	features	of	situations	besides	emotions.	An	example	of	this	is	provided	by	the	literature	on	animals’	reactions	to	conspecifics’	deaths.	Death	can	be	construed	as	morally	relevant,	 insofar	as,	other	 things	being	 equal,	 it	 is	 a	 bad-making	 feature	of	 situations	 that	 calls	 for	 a	 certain	reaction	 in	beings	who	 care	about	 the	deceased.	 In	order	 to	 respond	 in	a	morally	 laden																																																														15	 This	 of	 course	 connects	 to	 theory	 of	 mind,	 and	 sometimes	 it	 may	 be	 useful	 (perhaps	 even	necessary)	 for	 an	 animal	 to	 first	 determine	 that	 another	 is	 in	 a	 particular	 mental	 state	 before	exercising	a	moral	capacity.	However,	we	do	not	want	to	circumscribe	our	claims	to	animals	who	possess	 a	 theory	 of	 mind.	 Instead,	 we	 follow	 Andrews	 (2018)	 in	 considering	 that	 many	 socio-cognitive	practices	don’t	require	mindreading	but	trait	attribution,	understanding	of	past	history,	relationship	status,	etc.,	and,	following	Monsó	(2015),	we	consider	it	quite	likely	that	this	pluralistic	set	of	capacities	for	predicting	and	understanding	others	is	sufficient	for	the	exercise	of	many	moral	capacities.		
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way	to	death,	animals	would	have	to	first	discriminate	that	they	are	dealing	with	a	dead	individual,	 which	 could	 in	 principle	 be	 done	 through	 touch.	 In	 fact,	 a	 variety	 of	 social	mammals	have	been	witnessed	insistently	touching	or	nudging	corpses	(for	reviews,	see	Fashing	and	Nguyen	2011;	Boesch	2012,	chapter	7;	Anderson	2016).	The	meaning	of	this	behaviour	 is	 unclear,	 but	 it	 entails	 bodily	 contact	 and	 thus	 offers	 the	 animals	 tactile	information	that	points	to	the	state	of	the	dead	conspecific:	she	is	not	responding	the	way	she	 usually	 would	 to	 touch,	 and	 she	 does	 not	 feel	 the	 way	 she	 used	 to,	 e.g.	 because	 of	limpness	 or,	 later,	 rigor	 mortis	 and	 coldness.	 The	 death	 of	 a	 conspecific	 can	 thus	 be	grasped	to	a	degree	by	means	of	the	tactile	sense.	Similarly,	touching	injured,	disabled,	or	sick	conspecifics	may	provide	information	on	their	state	(e.g.	when	they	flinch	or	respond	unusually	to	a	common	form	of	touch),	thus	providing	a	reason	to	adapt	one’s	interactions	with	them.			 Another	example	of	situations	in	which	social	information	can	be	gained	by	means	of	 touch	 are	 play	 fights	 and	 aggressive	 encounters.	 Puppies	 are	 often	 described	 as	 not	knowing	 their	own	strength	yet,	which	may	well	be	said	 for	any	mammalian	young	at	a	certain	 developmental	 stage.	 Rough-and-tumble	 play	 provides	 an	 opportunity	 to	 learn	about	 one’s	 own	 and	 others’	 strength,	 information	 that	 is	 gathered	 most	 prominently	through	 touch.	 Moreover,	 tactile	 information	 about	 the	 other’s	 strength	 and	 character	gained	 through	play	 and	aggressive	 interactions	 can	 shape	 relationships	 and	determine	one’s	own	and	the	other’s	status,	which	could	 in	 turn	provide	a	context	 for	many	moral	practices.	Deciding,	for	instance,	 if	and	when	to	share	food	with,	groom,	help,	or	console	another	will	depend	on	the	characteristics	of	the	preexisting	relationship.		 These	 are	 just	 some	 examples	 of	 how	 touch	 can	 contain	morally	 relevant	 social	information	regarding	others’	characteristics	and	present	state,	as	well	as	one’s	capacities	and	 relationship	 to	 others.	 Lack	 of	 attention	 to	 the	 discriminative	 powers	 of	 touch	 can	result	in	scientists	misconstruing	or	simplifying	the	range	of	social	information	available	to	 an	 animal	 in	 a	 certain	 situation.	 For	 instance,	 some	 scientists	 have	 speculated	 that	monkey	mothers	who	 carry	 the	mummified	 remains	 of	 their	 dead	 infants	 for	 extended	periods	of	time	perhaps	do	so	because	they	haven’t	properly	processed	the	change	in	the	infant’s	state,	given	that	the	mummification	allows	the	corpse	to	retain	its	shape	and	still	be	 visually	 recognisable	 as	 an	 infant	 (e.g.	 De	 Marco	 2018).	 This	 ignores	 how	 radically	different	a	dead	infant	will	feel	from	the	very	first	moment	when	compared	to	a	live	one.	Incorporating	 the	 study	of	 touch	 as	 a	medium	 for	 social	 information	 can	 thus	 give	us	 a	richer	and	more	accurate	account	of	the	mechanisms	underlying	the	behaviour	of	animals	and	has	the	potential	to	help	us	uncover	moral	practices.		
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	4.	The	affiliative	function	of	touch	and	its	importance	for	animal	morality		Touching	another	 individual	 is	not	only	a	source	of	 information,	 it	can	also	be	a	form	of	affiliation.	Although	the	term	‘affiliation’	refers	to	any	behaviour	that	serves	to	strengthen	social	bonds,	it	often	takes	the	form	of	voluntary	bodily	contact	between	individuals,	e.g.	in	the	context	of	parental16	care	(Feldman	2011)	or	social	grooming	(Spruijt	et	al.	1992).	In	this	section,	we	will	argue	that	affiliative	touch	is	linked	to	morality	(1)	indirectly,	due	to	the	causal	connection	between	parental	touch	and	normal	development,	and	(2)	directly,	since	affiliative	touch	could	be	an	expression	of	moral	emotions.		The	 link	 between	 parental	 touch	 and	 development	 was	 demonstrated	 by	 the	infamous	 maternal	 deprivation	 studies	 first	 conducted	 in	 the	 1950s.	 In	 one	 of	 these	studies	by	Harlow	(1958),	infant	monkeys	were	taken	from	their	mothers	and	were	either	offered	 a	 surrogate	made	 of	 bare	mesh	wire	 or	 one	 draped	 in	 soft	 cloth.	When	 given	 a	choice	between	the	 two	conditions,	 the	monkeys	strongly	preferred	 the	cloth	surrogate,	even	 when	 only	 the	 wire	 surrogate	 provided	 food.	 While	 monkeys	 in	 both	 surrogate	conditions	 took	 in	 the	same	amount	of	milk	and	gained	the	same	amount	of	weight,	 the	monkeys	 in	 the	wire	 surrogate	 condition	 showed	psychosomatic	 symptoms,	which	 lead	Harlow	 to	 conclude	 that	 “[t]he	wire	mother	 is	 biologically	 adequate	but	psychologically	inept”	 (Harlow	 1958,	 677).	 Furthermore,	 in	 an	 open-field	 test,	 where	 Harlow	 put	surrogate-raised	monkeys	in	a	room	with	novel	stimuli,	either	with	or	without	 the	cloth	surrogate,	he	found	that	in	the	condition	with	the	surrogate	available	the	infants	displayed	less	 behavioural	 signs	 of	 stress.	 The	 surrogate	 thus	 seemed	 to	 function	 as	 a	 “source	 of	security”	(ibid.,	679).		This	 research	 led	 to	 two	 novel	 insights	 relevant	 for	 our	 case	 that	 have	 been	supported	by	 follow-up	studies:	 first,	parental	touch,	and	not	as	previously	assumed	the	providing	of	food	by	the	parent,	seems	to	be	crucial	in	the	emergence	of	the	parent-infant	




species	(Hertenstein	et	al.	2006;	Feldman	201117).	The	capacities	for	attachment	and	emotional	self-regulation	are	indirectly	relevant	for	morality	because	they	enable	the	emergence	of	sociality.	We	understand	sociality	as	a	prerequisite	 for	morality,	 since	 the	 ability	 to	abandon	a	 self-centred	stance	 is	necessary	for	one’s	attitudes	 to	be	directed	 towards	 the	welfare	of	others.18	And	as	Botero	argues,	emotional	 self-regulation,	 facilitated	 by	 the	 soothing	 effect	 of	 parental	 touch,	 is	 a	precondition	for	being	able	to	pay	attention	to	others	(Botero	2018b,	376–377),	which	is	critical	 for	 behaviour	 to	 be	 other-directed.	 Furthermore,	 concern	 for	 others	 can	 be	motivated	and	modulated	by	attachment,	for	which	the	parent-infant	attachment	seems	to	act	 as	 a	 blueprint.	 This	 first	 attachment	 facilitates	 the	 emergence	 of	 capacities	 that	 are	necessary	for	forming	further	social	bonds,	such	as	play	tendencies	(Lévy	et	al.	2003)	or	social	 discrimination,	 the	 ability	 to	 distinguish	 familiar	 from	 unfamiliar	 conspecifics	(Kentrop	et	al.	2018).	The	latter	has	also	been	found	to	play	a	crucial	role	in	the	triggering	of	empathic	mechanisms	across	species	(de	Waal	and	Preston	2017).	Therefore,	parental	touch	facilitates	basic	capacities	necessary	for	moral	practice.	However,	parental	care	isn’t	only	indirectly	relevant	for	animal	morality,	it	could	also	be	a	direct	expression	of	moral	capacities.	To	the	extent	that	the	parent	is	motivated	by	a	moral	emotion,	such	as	love,	whenever	she	grooms,	holds,	or	nurses	her	 infant,	we	can	speak	of	her	affiliative	touch	as	a	moral	practice	in	itself.	Affiliative	touch,	however,	is	not	exclusive	to	parent-infant	interactions,	but	is	instead	an	integral	part	of	the	social	lives	of	many	animals	 at	 all	 developmental	 stages	 and	across	different	 sorts	 of	 relationships.	Therefore,	 affiliative	 touch	 can	 also	 be	 an	 expression	 of	 moral	 emotions	 beyond	 the	parent-infant	 bond.	 The	 most	 obvious	 example,	 which	 is	 widely	 studied	 and	 well-documented	 in	 the	 literature,	 is	 consolation	 behaviour.	 This	 behaviour,	 as	 explained	 in																																																														17	 Feldman	 (2011,	 373)	 notes:	 “Maternal	 touch	 patterns	 are	 among	 the	 most	 evolutionarily	conserved	behaviors	and,	as	such,	there	is	marked	consistency	in	the	genetic,	neuroendocrine,	and	brain	circuitry	between	humans	and	other	mammals.	[…]	Such	consistency	in	the	role	of	maternal	touch	between	humans	and	other	mammals	renders	research	in	animal	models	particularly	useful	for	 understanding	 the	 biological	 underpinnings	 of	 early	 touch	 and	 contact	 and	 their	 effect	 on	shaping	the	infant’s	capacity	for	social	affiliation	and	stress	modulation	throughout	life.”	18	Although	in	this	section	we	emphasise	prosocial	behaviours,	given	that	the	focus	is	on	affiliation,	the	 link	 between	morality	and	 sociality	 doesn’t	 circumscribe	 solely	 the	 positive	 side	 of	morality.	Cruelty,	 for	example,	 is	an	attitude	 that	has	 the	other’s	(negative)	welfare	as	 its	goal	and,	 in	 that	sense,	it	also	requires	abandoning	a	purely	self-centred	stance.	In	addition,	our	view	regarding	the	importance	of	sociality	for	morality	should	not	be	taken	to	imply	that	egoism	or	callousness	are	not	moral	attitudes.	Our	point	is	that	one	can	only	make	sense	of	the	morality	of	an	animal’s	attitudes	if	one	 assumes	 the	 animal	 has	 the	 capacity	 to	 abandon	 a	 self-centred	 stance.	 This	 applies	 also	 to	callous	 and	 egoistic	 attitudes.	 Animals	who	 naturally	 lead	 solitary	 lives	 and	 lack	 all	 capacity	 to	engage	with	others	could	not	be	said	 to	be	egoistic	or	callous,	at	 least	not	 in	 the	moral	 sense	of	these	terms.		
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section	2,	occurs	as	a	response	 to	distress	behaviour	 in	others	and	most	often	takes	the	form	 of	 affiliative	 touch.	 Consolation,	 in	 turn,	 is	 generally	 thought	 to	 be	 motivated	 by	empathy	or	sympathy	(see	e.g.	de	Waal	and	Preston	2017),	 so	affiliative	touch	would	be	functioning	here	as	an	expression	of	these	moral	emotions.			Affiliative	 touch	 can	 also	 point	 us	 to	 other	 moral	 emotions	 beyond	 empathy,	sympathy,	 and	parental	 love.	The	potential	 of	 affiliative	 touch	 to	uncover	 further	moral	emotions	has	 to	do	with	 the	 strong	social	significance	 that	 this	 interaction	has	 in	many	animal	societies.	Although	some	of	these	emotions	may	ultimately	be	beyond	the	reach	of	(most)	animals,	we	propose	grief,	gratitude,	jealousy,	and	resentment	as	exemplary	moral	capacities	 that	 could	 either	 be	 expressed	 by	 affiliative	 touch	 or	 through	 its	 prevention,	disruption,	or	evasion.	Grief	may	be	manifested	by	means	of	affiliative	contact	towards	a	corpse,	 including	 grooming,	 prolonged	 holding,	 and	 protective	 behaviours	 such	 as	preventing	 others	 from	 touching	 it.19	 Gratitude	 could	 be	 expressed	 by	 spontaneous	affiliative	 touching	 directed	 at	 a	 benefactor.	 Jealousy,	 as	 a	 negative	 emotion	 evoked	 by	affiliation	 in	 others,	 could	 take	 the	 form	 of	 attempts	 to	 prevent	 affiliative	 touch	 or	 to	disrupt	 its	 occurrence.	 And	 lastly,	 resentment	 could	 be	 expressed	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 a	conflict	 by	 avoiding	 the	offender’s	 touch,	 ignoring	attempts	at	affiliation,	 or	 engaging	 in	aggressive	 responses	 to	 affiliation	 attempts.	 The	 ways	 and	 contexts	 in	 which	 animals	manifest	and	respond	to	affiliative	touch	could	thus	give	us	insight	into	moral	capacities	that	have	received	 little	attention	 in	 the	animal	morality	debate	so	 far.	 In	addition,	 they	also	point	to	the	importance	of	performing	field	studies,	since	these	capacities	could	never	be	 detected	 without	 considering	 the	 social	 context	 and	 history	 in	 which	 they	 are	embedded	and	without	allowing	for	animals	to	freely	and	spontaneously	engage	in	social	interactions	with	their	conspecifics.			5.	The	vigilance	function	of	the	tactile	sense	and	its	importance	for	animal	morality		Filip	Mattens	(2017)	has	argued	that	there	is	a	third	function	that	can	be	attributed	to	the	tactile	sense,	 namely,	 the	 vigilance	 function.	Mattens	 criticises	philosophers	of	 touch	 for	their	 excessive	 focus	 on	 the	 hands	 and	 the	 discriminative	 function	 of	 touch.	 Hands	 or	organs	with	 the	 function	 of	 touching	 in	 order	 to	 feel	 are	 a	 rare	 feature	 once	 we	move	beyond	 the	 primate	 order,	 and	 yet,	we	 attribute	 a	 tactile	 sense,	 at	 the	 very	 least,	 to	 all	mammals.	 That	 is	 because	 the	 tactile	 sense	 is	 not	 something	 that	 is	 circumscribed	 to																																																														19	 The	 prolonged	 transportation	 and	 nurturing	 of	 an	 infant’s	 corpse	 have	 been	 witnessed	 in	mothers	from	a	wide	range	of	mammalian	species	(Reggente	et	al.	2016).	
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hands,	 but	 a	 body-wide	 feature.	 This,	 he	 argues,	 suggests	 that	 the	 basal	 function	 of	 the	tactile	sense	is	not	its	discriminative	function:		 Although	not	all	areas	of	the	body	are	used	for	touching,	nearly	every	single	area	can	 sense	 when	 something	 touches	 it.	 Because	 it	 signals	 when	 and	 where	 an	animal	 is	being	touched,	tactile	sensitivity	functions	like	a	surveillance	system:	it	keeps	a	watch	on	the	animal’s	body.	(Ibid.,	690)		The	vigilance	function	of	the	tactile	sense	is	distinct	from	its	discriminative	function.	This	is	easily	illustrated	by	considering	cases	in	which	you	are	touched	by	something	that	is	not	anticipated	by	your	other	senses	and	thus	met	with	a	startle	response:	“[a]s	soon	as	you	sense	 the	slightest	contact,	you	 flinch	back.	You	do	not	wait	until	 it	 is	clear	whether	 the	object	 is	 injurious;	 you	 flinch	 back	 before	 you	 even	 know	 what	 touched	 you”	 (Ibid.,	emphasis	 in	 the	 original).	 Touch	 in	 its	 vigilance	 function	 is	 not	 meant	 as	 a	 means	 for	exploring	objects,	but	as	a	way	of	protecting	 the	body.	This	 function	of	 touch,	 therefore,	“does	not	 first	and	 foremost	serve	 the	animal’s	desire	 to	 touch,	but	rather	[her]	need	 to	know	that	[she]	is	being	touched”	(Ibid.,	emphasis	in	the	original).		 The	 vigilance	 function	 of	 touch	 thus	 points	 us	 to	 the	 body’s	 vulnerability.	 The	tactile	sense	watches	over	the	body	because,	whenever	something	touches	our	body,	there	is	 a	 potential	 threat	 to	 our	 health	 and	 integrity.	 And	 indeed,	 when	 an	 animal	 touches	another,	she	is	invading	their	bodily	space,	thus	becoming	a	potential	threat	to	them	while	also	risking	injury	herself.	Both	animals	are	made	more	vulnerable	by	this	interaction.	As	we	will	argue	in	this	section,	studying	how	animals	navigate	this	increase	in	vulnerability	that	occurs	as	a	result	of	touch	may	illuminate	further	moral	capacities.	In	particular,	it	has	the	potential	to	reveal	capacities	of	trust,	care,	and	tolerance,	moral	capacities	involved	in	antisocial	behaviour,	such	as	cruelty,	and	normative	capacities.	Although	until	now	 it	has	barely	been	 taken	up	as	a	research	topic	 in	the	animal	morality	debate,	trust	can	be	plausibly	regarded	as	a	moral	capacity	insofar	as	it	is	likely	a	necessary	mechanism	(or	at	least	a	very	useful	one)	for	a	moral	society	to	function.	Moral	societies	are	generally	regarded	as	ones	in	which	individuals	do	not	merely	pursue	their	own	selfish	desires,	but	rather	decide	to	cooperate	and	look	out	for	others’	 interests	too	(e.g.	Tomasello	2016).	In	order	to	ensure	that	this	works,	members	of	the	society	need	to	place	trust	in	that	the	others	will	reciprocate	(Ibid.,	162ff.).	But	trust	may	also	be	involved	in	 other	 interactions	 beside	 reciprocity.	 Whenever	 animals	 engage	 in	 behaviours	 like	grooming,	contact	sleeping,	or	social	play,	they	are	placing	themselves	in	a	situation	that	makes	 them	 more	 vulnerable,	 and	 insofar	 as	 it	 is	 under	 the	 animal’s	 control	 to	 place	herself	in	this	situation,	we	could	speak	of	a	capacity	of	trust	in	the	other,	which	would	be	
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more	or	less	explicit	depending,	perhaps,	on	how	aware	the	animal	is	that	the	other	could	hurt	her.	It	 could,	 however,	 be	 argued	 that	 common	 behaviours	 like	 grooming,	 contact	sleeping,	or	social	play	do	not	necessarily	imply	that	the	animals	involved	trust	each	other;	instead,	 perhaps	 they	 have	merely	 learnt	 which	 touch	 behaviours	 are	 safe	 or	 effective.	This	may	 be	 true,	 but	 it	 does	 not	 necessarily	 exclude	 an	 explanation	 in	 terms	 of	 trust.	Instead,	 this	 learning	 process	might	 precisely	 amount	 to	 a	 development	 of	 trust.	 Trust	does	 not	 have	 to	 be	 something	 that	 is	 explicitly	 present	 in	 the	 animal’s	 mind	 as	 a	propositional	judgement	such	as	“This	individual	can	be	trusted.”	Rather,	trust	may	be	a	capacity	 that	 is	 implicit	 in	 their	 choosing	 to	 place	 themselves	 in	 a	 situation	 that	makes	them	more	vulnerable.		Another	objection	here	might	be	that	the	very	neurophysiology	of	touch,	which	we	discussed	 in	 section	 2,	 makes	 these	 sorts	 of	 affiliative	 interactions	 pleasurable	 for	 the	animals,	so	that	there	is	no	role	for	trust	to	play,	but	rather	the	animals	are	just	motivated	to	encourage	what	they	feel	as	a	pleasant	stimulus.	We	believe	that	it	 is	quite	likely	that	part	of	the	motivation	for	engaging	in	affiliation	is	indeed	that	it	is	inherently	rewarding.	However,	two	things	must	be	borne	in	mind.	The	first	one	is	that	the	individual	initiating	the	affiliation	might	not	get	pleasure	out	of	 it	 right	away,	and	still	 this	 individual	 is	also	risking	 injury.	 Second,	 and	 relatedly,	 the	 fact	 that	 the	neurophysiology	of	 touch	 ensures	that	affiliation	 is	pleasant	does	not	mean	that	 things	can’t	go	wrong.	Not	all	attempts	at	affiliation	are	successful.	And	for	the	animal	on	the	receiving	end	there	is	always	the	risk	of	misreading	the	situation,	interpreting	as	an	affiliative	approach	what	is	not,	which	likely	means	that	the	animals	who	purposefully	let	others	touch	them	implicitly	trust	them.		The	capacity	of	trust	may	also	be	manifested	in	certain	touch	behaviours	that	some	animals	 engage	 in	 and	 that	 seem	 to	 create	 vulnerability	 as	 a	 gesture	 of	 reassurance	 or	friendliness.	 One	 example	 first	 described	 in	 chimps	 has	 been	 aptly	 named	 ‘vulnerable	contact	behaviour’	and	consists	of	 inserting	a	 finger	 into	another’s	mouth	(Nishida	et	al.	2010,	145),	either	to	appease	another	in	distress	or	to	reassure	oneself.	De	Waal	(1989)	puts	the	use	and	risk	of	this	behaviour	into	context:		Chimpanzees	 have	 a	 habit	 of	 putting	 their	 fingers	 or	 the	 back	 of	 one	 hand	between	 the	teeth	 of	 dominant	 group	members.	A	 friendly	 gesture,	 it	 is	 also	 a	 test	 of	 the	 dominant’s	state	of	arousal	and	often	 is	used	 in	ambiguous	situations.	 I	 experienced	 it	myself	when	performing	psychological	experiments	with	two	juvenile	chimpanzees	at	the	University	of	Nijmegen.	 Each	 day	 I	 spent	 hours	 in	 a	 room	with	 them,	 and	 occasionally	 their	 constant	mischievousness	would	get	on	my	nerves.	They	would	notice	 the	slightest	 irritation	and	hurry	over	to	fill	my	mouth	with	their	big	hands.	Of	course,	I	never	bit,	but	in	the	Arnhem	colony	 I	have	seen	quite	a	 few	 instances	when	 fingers	were	not	 treated	so	gently	during	appeasement	attempts.	Young	chimpanzees	of	 three	years	or	 less,	who	may	have	 lacked	
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the	 experience	 to	 judge	 whether	 the	 gesture	 was	 safe	 or	 not,	 were	 almost	 always	 the	victims	of	such	bites.	(80)		Vulnerable	contact	behaviour	also	takes	other	forms	amongst	primates.	Once	more	in	the	context	of	peace-keeping,	de	Waal	(1989)	describes	the	following	behaviour:			[M]ale	 chimpanzees	 often	 finger	 each	 other’s	 scrotum	 at	 moments	 of	 mild	 tension,	 a	gesture	 irreverently	 known	 among	 field-workers	 as	 ball	 bouncing.	 Is	 there	 a	 more	convincing	way	of	 indicating	friendly	intentions	than	by	touching	these	vulnerable	parts?	(79)		Anecdotal	evidence	also	points	to	the	consolidation	of	alliances	by	means	of	gently	holding	another’s	testicles	in	other	primates	(e.g.	Balter	2010).	Vulnerable	contact	behaviour	has	also	been	witnessed	in	elephants,	who	will	touch	or	put	their	trunk	inside	the	mouth	of	a	distressed	conspecific	(Plotnik	and	de	Waal	2014,	12).	A	recent	study	on	captive	orcas	also	documents	 what	 appears	 to	 be	 vulnerable	 contact	 behaviour:	 the	 orcas	 were	 found	 to	occasionally	put	their	snouts	together,	and	then	one	of	them	would	insert	her	tongue	into	the	mouth	of	the	other,	who	would	gently	bite	it.	The	authors	interpret	this	as	an	affiliative	gesture	(Sánchez-Hernández	et	al.	forthcoming).		 Even	 if	 we	were	 to	 favour	 a	more	 intellectualistic	 notion	 of	 trust	 that	 excluded	these	behaviours	 from	counting	as	expressions	of	such,	 these	sorts	of	 interactions	could	still	point	us	to	the	capacity	of	care	or	tact.	A	chimpanzee	holding	another’s	testicles	or	an	orca	 biting	 another’s	 tongue	 are	 examples	 of	 situations	 in	which	 an	 animal	 could	 very	easily	hurt	the	other,	but	she	apparently	puts	care	into	making	sure	this	doesn’t	happen.	And	 this	 extends	 beyond	 vulnerable	 contact	 behaviour.	 For	 instance,	 controlling	 the	strength	with	which	one	bites	during	play	or	carrying	one’s	offspring	 in	 the	mouth	with	the	 exact	 pressure	 needed	 to	 hold	 them	 without	 hurting	 them	 could	 also	 constitute	examples	of	animals	exhibiting	care.	To	be	sure,	whether	or	not	these	count	as	instances	of	care	or	tact	will	be	a	function	of	the	amount	of	behavioural	flexibility	and	self-control	the	animal	has.	If	she	could	not	perform	the	behaviour	any	other	way	then	it	would	not	make	sense	 to	 say	 that	 she	 is	 putting	 care	 into	 how	 she	 does	 it.	 This	 is	 not	 particularly	problematic,	however,	since	the	study	of	moral	capacities	in	animals	must	in	any	case	go	hand-in-hand	with	the	study	of	animal	self-control	(see	Monsó	and	Andrews	forthcoming).	There	 may	 be	 more	 to	 learn	 about	 the	 moral	 capacities	 of	 animals	 if	 we	 look	further	 beyond	 gentle	 touch.	 For	 instance,	 young	 animals	 of	 various	 species	 often	 play	with	each	other	or	with	adults	in	ways	that	can	be	quite	painful.	These	individuals	enjoy	enormous	levels	of	tolerance	from	the	older	members	of	the	group.	In	the	case	of	young	chimpanzees,	for	instance,	de	Waal	writes:	“They	can	do	nothing	wrong,	such	as	using	the	back	of	a	dominant	male	as	a	trampoline,	[...]	or	hitting	an	older	juvenile	as	hard	as	they	can”	 (de	Waal	 2014,	 189).	 Tolerance	 is	 also	 a	moral	 capacity	 that	 has	 not	 received	 the	
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attention	it	deserves.	Having	a	young	chimp	use	your	back	as	a	trampoline	or	hit	you	as	hard	 as	 she	 can	 must	 hurt.	 If	 it	 were	 an	 older	 chimp	 doing	 it,	 this	 would	 trigger	 an	aggressive	 response	 in	 return,	 so	 it	 is	possible	 that	 there	 is	 an	 inhibition	 of	 aggression	going	 on	 that	 could	 also	 plausibly	 be	 regarded	as	 a	moral	 capacity.	 The	 fact	 that	 social	tolerance	and	the	inhibition	of	aggression	have	not	been	considered	as	research	topics	in	the	animal	morality	debate	highlights	a	bias	towards	moral	capacities	that	are	manifested	
actively.	But	one	can	also	exercise	a	moral	capacity	by	refraining	from	doing	things.			 The	ways	in	which	animals	navigate	each	other’s	vulnerability	could	thus	give	us	evidence	 of	 various	 moral	 capacities.	 But	 what	 about	 cases	 in	 which	 the	 animals	purposefully	hurt	each	other?	The	animal	morality	debate	has	until	now	focused	almost	exclusively	 on	 prosocial	 behaviour	 and	 its	 underlying	mechanisms.	We	 suggest	 that	 it’s	also	 important	 to	 look	at	antagonistic	 and	antisocial	 interactions	 in	our	 search	of	moral	capacities	beyond	the	human	species.	Consider	the	following	description	of	an	aggressive	altercation	among	captive	chimpanzees:		 Luit	was	alpha	 for	 only	 ten	weeks.	 The	Yeroen-Nikkie	alliance	made	 a	comeback	with	a	bloody	 vengeance	 one	 night	 during	which	 the	 two	 allies	 together	 severely	 injured	 Luit.	Apart	 from	 biting	 off	 fingers	 and	 toes	 and	 causing	 deep	 gashes	 everywhere,	 the	 two	aggressors	removed	Luit's	testicles,	which	were	found	on	the	cage	floor.	Luit	died	on	the	operating	table	due	to	loss	of	blood	from	the	fight,	which	took	place	in	a	night	cage	with	only	the	three	senior	males	present.	Given	the	victim’s	massive	injuries	and	the	relatively	few	 injuries	 sustained	 by	 the	 other	 two,	 we	 must	 assume	 a	 remarkable	 level	 of	coordination	between	Nikkie	and	Yeroen.	(de	Waal	1998,	211)		To	be	clear,	by	citing	this	example	we	do	not	mean	to	imply	that	this	incident	necessarily	amounted	to	a	moral	practice.	Perhaps	Nikkie	and	Yeroen	were	motivated	by	a	non-moral	desire	 to	 rise	 in	 the	 social	 hierarchy.	 But	 the	 interaction	 could	 have	 had	 a	 moral	component	if,	 for	instance,	Nikkie	and	Yeroen	enjoyed	and	purposefully	prolonged	Luit’s	suffering.	 While	 this	 single	 anecdote	 is	 far	 from	 definitive,	 the	 fact	 remains	 that	chimpanzees	are	capable	of	very	sophisticated	social	cognition	(which	suggests	they	might	have	understood	that	Luit	was	suffering)	and	exhibit	high	levels	of	behavioural	flexibility	(which	 suggests	 a	 certain	 degree	 of	 control	 over	 the	 way	 in	 which	 the	 killing	 was	performed).	Thus,	the	extreme	violence	displayed	is	noteworthy	and	justifies	paying	more	attention	to	cases	like	this.		Lethal	 intra-specific	 coalitionary	 aggression	 in	 chimpanzees	 has	 also	 been	documented	 in	 the	wild,	 both	within	 and	outside	 the	 instigators’	 own	 social	 group	 (e.g.	Kaburu	et	al.	2013;	Pruetz	et	al.	2017).	Additionally,	non-predatory	inter-specific	killings	have	been	witnessed	in	several	mammalian	species.	For	instance,	killer	whales	have	been	described	 to	 kill	 narwhal	 “for	 fun”	 in	 a	 variety	 of	 ways,	 like	 drowning,	 ramming,	 and	mutilating	them,	and	then	“playing	soccer”	with	their	body	parts	(Ferguson	et	al.	2012,	7,	
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11).	 Bottlenose	 dolphins	 have	 also	 been	 observed	 to	 harass	 harbour	 porpoises,	 only	 to	brutally	kill	them	and	abandon	their	bodies	(Cotter	2011).	Depending	on	the	behavioural	flexibility	manifested	 in	these	 interactions,	 the	social	context	surrounding	 them,	and	 the	amount	 of	 premeditation	 involved,	 emotions	 like	 cruelty,	 envy,	 resentment,	schadenfreude,	or	blood	lust	could	be	driving	the	behaviour.	Perhaps	these	emotions	are	exclusively	 human,	 but	 this	 should	 not	 be	 established	 from	 the	 armchair.	 Not	 even	considering	the	possibility	that	animals	may	also	possess	these	negative	moral	emotions	could	also	amount	to	a	distorted	or	partial	account	of	animal	morality.		 Before	we	 conclude,	we	would	 like	 to	mention	 how	 touch	 can	 also	 illuminate	 a	final,	 very	 important	 branch	 of	 the	 animal	morality	 debate:	 the	 study	 of	 the	 normative	capacities	of	animals.	Although	animals’	ability	to	follow	and	enforce	normative	standards	of	 behaviour	 has	 only	 begun	 to	 be	 systematically	 studied	 in	 the	 lab	 (e.g.	 by	measuring	chimpanzees’	 spontaneous	 reactions	 to	 videos	 of	 infanticide	 [Rudolf	 von	 Rohr	 et	 al.	2015]),	 normativity	 figures	prominently	 in	many	accounts	 of	morality	 and	much	 of	 the	work	 done	 on	 the	 evolution	 of	 human	 morality	 has	 focused	 on	 the	 emergence	 of	 our	normative	capacities	(e.g.	Joyce	2007;	Kitcher	2014;	Tomasello	2016).	In	addition,	Kristin	Andrews,	one	of	the	most	prominent	philosophers	in	the	animal	morality	debate,	has	also	focused	a	great	deal	of	her	work	on	animal	normativity	(e.g.	Andrews	2009;	2013;	2020).	Thus,	 it	 is	worth	considering	 to	what	extent	 the	study	of	 touch	can	be	 illuminating	here	too.20	Although	discriminative	and	affective	touch	could	possibly	have	a	role	to	play	in	the	enforcement	of	animal	social	norms	(for	 instance,	discriminative	 touch	could	be	used	 to	determine	when	an	animal	is	not	playing	‘fairly,’	and	affective	touch	could	perhaps	be	used	to	reinforce	norm-appropriate	behaviour),	we	believe	that	the	vigilance	function	of	touch	is	likely	the	most	relevant	when	it	comes	to	considering	how	touch	can	inform	the	study	of	animal	normativity.		 Following	Andrews	 (2020),	we	 assume	 that	 an	 animal	 social	 norm	occurs	when	“(a)	there	is	a	pattern	of	behavior	demonstrated	by	community	members;	(b)	individuals	choose	 to	 conform	 to	 the	 pattern	 of	 behavior;	 (c)	 individuals	 expect	 that	 community	members	will	also	conform,	and	will	sanction	those	who	do	not	conform.”	We	believe	that	a	fruitful	area	of	study	for	uncovering	animal	social	norms	thus	understood	concerns	how	animals	 navigate	 each	 other’s	 bodily	 vulnerability.	 Looking	 at	 how	 animals	 touch	 each	other,	when	 they	 refrain	 from	 touching	 each	 other,	 how	 they	 react	 to	 others’	 touch,	 or	when	they	decide	to	intervene	to	stop	others	from	touching	could	illuminate	what	animals	consider	 to	be	appropriate	 patterns	of	 behaviour,	 as	well	 as	 to	what	 extent	 they	 expect	
																																																													20	We	are	grateful	to	an	anonymous	reviewer	for	encouraging	us	to	take	on	this	point.	
	 21	








































Capensis)	in	the	East	Sea.”	Marine	Mammal	Science	29(4):	E508–14.		Parr,	Lisa.	2001.	“Cognitive	and	Physiological	Markers	of	Emotional	Awareness	in	Chimpanzees	(Pan	Troglodytes).”	Animal	Cognition	4(3–4):	223–29.		Parr,	Lisa.	2003.	“The	Discrimination	of	Faces	and	Their	Emotional	Content	by	Chimpanzees	(Pan	Troglodytes).”	Annals	of	the	New	York	Academy	of	Sciences	1000	(December):	56–78.	Parrott,	Gerrod.	 2019.	 “Emotions	 as	 Signals	 of	Moral	Character.”	 In	The	 Social	Nature	 of	
Emotion	 Expression,	 edited	 by	 Ursula	 Hess	 and	 Shlomo	 Hareli,	 161–77.	 Cham:	Springer	International	Publishing.		Pitcher,	Mark,	Claire	Le	Pichon,	and	Alexander	Chesler.	2016.	“Functional	Properties	of	C-Low	Threshold	Mechanoreceptors	(C-LTMRs)	in	Nonhuman	Mammals.”	In	
Affective	Touch	and	the	Neurophysiology	of	CT	Afferents,	edited	by	Håkan	Olausson,	Johan	Wessberg,	India	Morrison,	and	Francis	McGlone,	31–48.	New	York,	NY:	Springer	New	York.	Plotnik,	Joshua,	and	Frans	de	Waal.	2014.	“Asian	Elephants	(Elephas	Maximus)	Reassure	Others	in	Distress.”	PeerJ	2:	e278.		Pruetz,	Jill,	Kelly	Boyer	Ontl,	Elizabeth	Cleaveland,	Stacy	Lindshield,	Joshua	Marshack,	and	Erin	Wessling.	2017.	“Intragroup	Lethal	Aggression	in	West	African	Chimpanzees	(Pan	Troglodytes	Verus):	Inferred	Killing	of	a	Former	Alpha	Male	at	Fongoli,	Senegal.”	International	Journal	of	Primatology	38(1):	31–57.			Quervel-Chaumette,	Mylene,	Viola	Faerber,	Tamás	Faragó,	Sarah	Marshall-Pescini,	and	Friederike	Range.	2016.	“Investigating	Empathy-Like	Responding	to	Conspecifics’	Distress	in	Pet	Dogs.”	PLoS	ONE	11(4):	e0152920.	Range,	Friederike,	Lisa	Horn,	Zsófia	Viranyi,	and	Ludwig	Huber.	2009.	“The	Absence	of	Reward	Induces	Inequity	Aversion	in	Dogs.”	Proceedings	of	the	National	Academy	
of	Sciences	106(1):	340–45.			Reggente,	Melissa,	Filipe	Alves,	Cátia	Nicolau,	Luís	Freitas,	Daniele	Cagnazzi,	Robin	Baird,	and	Paolo	Galli.	2016.	“Nurturant	Behavior	toward	Dead	Conspecifics	in	Free-Ranging	Mammals:	New	Records	for	Odontocetes	and	a	General	Review.”	Journal	
of	Mammalogy,	May,	gyw089.		Rowlands,	Mark.	2012.	Can	Animals	Be	Moral?	New	York:	Oxford	University	Press.		Rudolf	von	Rohr,	Claudia,	Carel	van	Schaik,	Alexandra	Kissling,	and	Judith	Burkart.	2015.	“Chimpanzees’	Bystander	Reactions	to	Infanticide.”	Human	Nature	26	(2):	143–60.	Rutledge-Prior,	Serrin.	2019.	“Moral	Responsiveness	and	Nonhuman	Animals:	A	Challenge	to	Kantian	Morality.”	Ethics	&	the	Environment	24	(1):	45–76.		Sánchez–Hernández,	Paula,	Anastasia	Krasheninnikova,	Javier	Almunia,	and	Miguel	Molina–Borja.	Forthcoming.	“Social	Interaction	Analysis	in	Captive	Orcas	(Orcinus	Orca).”	Zoo	Biology.	DOI:	10.1002/zoo.21502	Schwing,	Raoul,	Ximena	Nelson,	Amelia	Wein,	and	Stuart	Parsons.	2017.	“Positive	Emotional	Contagion	in	a	New	Zealand	Parrot.”	Current	Biology	27(6):	R213–14.		Seed,	Amanda,	Nicola	Clayton,	and	Nathan	Emery.	2007.	“Postconflict	Third-Party	Affiliation	in	Rooks,	Corvus	Frugilegus.”	Current	Biology	17(2):	152–58.		Špinka,	Marek,	Ruth	Newberry,	and	Marc	Bekoff.	2001.	“Mammalian	Play:	Training	for	the	Unexpected.”	The	Quarterly	Review	of	Biology	76(2):	141–68.	Spruijt,	Berry,	Johan	van	Hooff,	and	Willem	Gispen.	1992.	“Ethology	and	Neurobiology	of	Grooming	Behavior.”	Physiological	Reviews	72(3):	825–52.	Tomasello,	Michael.	2016.	A	Natural	History	of	Human	Morality.	Cambridge,	Massachusetts:	Harvard	University	Press.	Ueno,	Hiroshi,	Shunsuke	Suemitsu,	Shinji	Murakami,	Naoya	Kitamura,	Kenta	Wani,	Yosuke	Matsumoto,	Motoi	Okamoto,	and	Takeshi	Ishihara.	2019.	“Helping-Like	Behaviour	in	Mice	Towards	Conspecifics	Constrained	Inside	Tubes.”	Scientific	Reports	9(1):	5817.		
	 27	
	Uvnäs-Moberg,	Kerstin,	Ingemar	Arn,	and	David	Magnusson.	2005.	“The	Psychobiology	of	Emotion:	The	Role	of	the	Oxytocinergic	System.”	International	Journal	of	
Behavioral	Medicine	12(2):	59–65		Warneken,	Felix,	and	Michael	Tomasello.	2006.	“Altruistic	Helping	in	Human	Infants	and	Young	Chimpanzees.”	Science	311(5765):	1301–3.		Wascher,	Claudia,	and	Thomas	Bugnyar.	2013.	“Behavioral	Responses	to	Inequity	in	Reward	Distribution	and	Working	Effort	in	Crows	and	Ravens.”	PLoS	ONE	8(2):	e56885.		Wascher,	Claudia,	Isabella	Scheiber,	and	Kurt	Kotrschal.	2008.	“Heart	Rate	Modulation	in	Bystanding	Geese	Watching	Social	and	Non-Social	Events.”	Proceedings	of	the	Royal	
Society	of	London	B:	Biological	Sciences	275(1643):	1653–59.		Watanabe,	Shigeru,	and	Kunihiko	Ono.	1986.	“An	Experimental	Analysis	of	‘Empathic’	Response:	Effects	of	Pain	Reactions	of	Pigeon	upon	Other	Pigeon’s	Operant	Behavior.”	Behavioural	Processes	13(3):	269–77.	Zahn-Waxler,	Carolyn,	Marian	Radkerrow,	Elizabeth	Wagner,	and	Michael	Chapman.	1992.	“Development	of	Concern	for	Others.”	Developmental	Psychology	28(1):	126-36.			
